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Can we perceive things outside our mind or brain – what we might call external or distant things, 
objects  and  events?  It  seems  that  any  theory  we  have  about  perception  ought  to  say  'yes'. 
Otherwise, how can we say that we perceivei the world in which we talk, think and live? A lot of 
important things in it are 'external' by this (very broad) meaning of the term.ii 
But  it  might  be  asked:  can  we  directly  or  immediately  perceive  external  things;  are  they  the 
possessors of the shapes, colours, weights, textures, sounds, and all other sensory qualities that 
are immediately presented to us in consciousness? It certainly seems that way. When I look out 
the window of the library to the distant mountains, I just seem to have a direct perception of the 
mountains. I do not seem to see them indirectly via seeing something else; seeing the mountains 
does not seem mediated. 
This is not true of everything I might report seeing, e.g., watching a nature programme, I might 
report seeing a gecko mimicking a beetle – but it also seems to me that I am doing so via television 
images. Yet, one might think that this obviously does not apply to seeing distant mountains. Seeing 
the distant mountains is just like seeing the television picture. Both seem to be paradigmatic cases 
of seeing and of direct or immediate perception. 
In addition,  these mountains  and  television  images certainly  seem to be outside my mind and 
body. Indeed, much of what I directly perceive seems to be external like this. So, in cases where it 
seems this way, can it be the case that I do directly perceive external things?
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Let us call  the perceptual  thesis that what  we directly or immediately perceive can be external 
things direct realism of external things – or, here, where we only consider apparent perceptions of 
external  things,  just  'direct  realism'.  Let  us  call  the  perceptual  thesis  that  what  we  directly  or 
immediately  perceive  cannot  be  external  things,  but  must  be  something  between  us  and  the 
external things, indirect realism of external things – or, here,  just 'indirect realism'.iii 
The purpose of this paper is to consider one particular argument for indirect realism. This is the 
time-lag argument, which is: because there is a delay between the external  things we seem to 
directly  perceive  and  when  we have  the  perception,  then  we  only  indirectly  perceive  external 
things.  I  suggest  that  this  argument  is  compelling  only  if  we  subscribe  to  a  particular,  albeit 
intuitive, conception of time known as presentism. The argument loses its force if we hold another 
less intuitive conception of time known as  eternalism.  However, as eternalism is considered by 
many to be supported by contemporary physical theory whereas presentism is not, this counter-
intuitive position is also a common one amongst philosophers of time. And I argue that if we are 
eternalists, time-lags do not particularly threaten our direct perception of external things. 
Intermediate entities and Sense-data
If the argument of this paper is sound, the time-lag argument does not particularly threaten direct 
realism. However,  it  is still  only one argument used by indirect  realists to deny that we directly 
perceive external things. There are other arguments, e.g., from (a) illusion or hallucination (e.g., 
Ayer 1982) and (b) the incompatibility of the properties we perceive with the properties of external 
things  (e.g.,  shape,  Moore  1953,  colour,  Hardin  1986;  blur,  Pace  2007).  This  leads  to  two 
important assumptions in this paper. 
Given indirect realism, if we directly perceive anything at all,iv then what we directly perceive will be 
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some things between the external world and ourselves, i.e., they will be some kind of intermediary 
entity. General theories about the nature of such intermediary entities are not discussed here, e.g., 
whether  they  are  non-physical  entities,  physical  entities  or  non-physical  properties  of  physical 
entities. This concerns the motivation for them from the time-lag argument. One particular indirect 
realism theory has been most  commonly  discussed in that  argument.  This is the sense-datum 
theory: very crudely, that intermediary  entities are sense-data which bear the properties that are 
apparent to us in experience, e.g., colour, shape, timbre, etc. (e.g., Price 1950, Moore 1953, Ayer 
1982). 
To focus  the discussion,  an initially  intuitive  position will  be assumed:  that,  whether  or  not  we 
directly  perceive  internal  or external  things,  we directly  perceive  something. Alternatively,  if  we 
wish to say that  we directly perceive certain  properties (e.g.,  phenomenal  properties)  then it  is 
assumed that we directly perceive these properties because  something bears them.  It seems to 
me that taking this position as an indirect realist is to accept sense-data; as Moore introduce them, 
sense-data are only the bearers of the properties, e.g., the colours, shapes, weights, timbres, etc., 
that we directly perceive.v 
Where  appropriate,  reference  is  sometimes  made  to  intermediary  entities  and  sometimes 
specifically  to  sense-data.  The  focus  throughout  is  on  whether  or  not  we  must  only  directly 
perceive these or if we can directly perceive external things.
Transparency Theory and Disjunctivism
This paper does not discuss the  other  arguments for indirect realism, i.e., (a) and (b) above.  If 
these  arguments  are  sound,  then we cannot  directly  perceive  external  things,  time-lag  or  not. 
Direct realists must still respond to such arguments. The target of this paper is not those convinced 
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by such arguments. Instead, it is directed toward those who are not. 
Some philosophers deny (a) and (b), e.g., transparency theorists and/or disjunctivists. But however 
successful  they are against  (a) and (b), their  responses do not obviously apply  to the time-lag 
argument. 
Transparency theory is the position that what we seem to directly perceive is  either identical to 
physical things or properties of physical things, and not something particular to experience itself; 
thus, experience is 'transparent', e.g., we seem to see the blueness of the sea rather than some 
non-physical 'blueness'. The examples of transparency theory tend to be entities external to us, 
although bodily things such as located pains also come into it  (e.g.,  Tye 2007).  Yet,  as will  be 
discussed,  if  the  time-lag  argument  is  sound,  appearances  are  not  relevant;  however  it  might 
seem,  we  must  directly  perceive  something  internal;  what  we  directly  perceive  cannot  be 
something external like the blue sea.
Disjunctivism (at least some variations) deny that we directly perceive a 'common kind' of entity in 
perceptions and their  perfect  hallucinations/illusions.  Thus,  we do not  need to directly  perceive 
intermediary  entities  when  perceiving  (e.g.,  Hinton  1973; for  discussion,  see  Haddock  and 
McPherson 2008). Yet,  the time-lag argument cannot  be rejected by this method.  The time-lag 
argument concerns only perceptions, not their perfect illusions or hallucinations. Trivially, there are 
common kinds of entities in perceptions and perceptions. 
There is no intention here to assume any positions on the above debates. In particular, nothing is 
assumed  about  the  relationship  between  what  we  directly  perceive  in  perceptions  and perfect 
hallucinations and illusions. However, due to the kind of perceptions discussed here, the range of 
what  we  seem  to perceive is limited to the kind of perceptions  to which transparency theories 
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should assent. Here, we are concerned with apparent perceptions of external things, of entities at 
a spatial distance from our body and ourselves. We are not so concerned with cases where we 
also seem to perceive internal entities, such as, e.g., pains and thoughts.
The paper, then, is divided into three sections: 
(i) The time-lag argument for indirect realism. Direct realist responses.
(ii) Motivations for accepting the argument even without considering the metaphysics of time. What 
these commit us to.
(iii) A denial of an important premise of the time-lag argument. This denial comes from an issue in 
the contemporary metaphysical debate about time.
1. The Time-lag Argument
Russell  considers when we see the sun.  We may  seem  to directly see the sun but we do not. 
'[W]here the sun seems to be now corresponds to the place where the physical  sun was eight 
minutes ago.' (Russell 1948: 217). Thus, according to Russell, what one sees is something else (in 
his case, sense-data), through which we indirectly see the sun. 
Implicit in Russell's claim is that, in order to directly perceive something, it must be simultaneous 
with the subject having the perception.vi That the sun's location we seem to see is 'eight minutes 
ago' is sufficient to deny that we directly perceive the sun at that location. This seems intuitive: if I 
do see a leaf blow by the window, then the leaf is blowing by the window now. When I hear a bird 
singing, it is when the bird is singing. It is intuitive to think that what I directly perceive is when I 
seem to perceive it.
However,  for this reason, the time-lag means we do not directly perceive what is  external. The 
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problem comes  from how it  is,  according  to  established  theory,  that  we get  to  perceive  such 
external things. We perceive something external when a signal from it reaches us, and that takes 
time. It follows, then, that there is an interval between when an event occurs and when we perceive 
it  - the time the signal  takes to travel  from the event.  But this means that what we believe we 
perceive is not happening right now, but actually happening some time in the past. 
This lag applies to processes underlying all sensory perceptions of external things but the striking 
examples are from processes underlying sight.  I  see the leaf  because it  reflects  light  onto my 
retina,  leading  to  a  process  which  results  in  my  perception  of  the  leaf.  Since  17 th 
 
century 
measurements by Römer, it has been known that light has a finite speed (e.g., Römer in Shapley 
and Howarth 1929; Moritz 1970; Zajonc 1993). As such, it takes time for light to reach me from its 
source. But its source is what I seem to see. Thus, what I see of the leaf, the sun, etc., is in the 
past. Something similar can be of course be said about hearing traffic; the source of the sound is in 
the past, even though that is what I seem to hear.
Thus,  the argument  goes,  we seem to perceive what  are actually  past  events  and not  events 
simultaneous with  our  perceptions.  Yet,  only  perception  simultaneous with  perceived events  is 
direct  perception  of  those  events.  Therefore,  we  do  not  directly  perceive  what  we  seem  to 
perceive; we must indirectly perceive it (perhaps, through it, e.g., causing our perception). 
Yet, why must direct perception be simultaneous with the perceived events? Ebersole and Ayer 
both argue as follows: we think that we have direct perceptions of external things, e.g., a football 
kick or a concrete object like a distant star. However,  it takes time for signals to reach us from 
those events: in the case of the football kick, a mere millisecond; in the case of a star, perhaps 
thousands of years. By the time the light reaches us, the thing we  seem  to perceive may have 
ceased to exist, e.g., in the intervening years, the star has exploded or faded in its luminescence. 
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Thus, what we seem to perceive is not something that is occurring or exists. 'It is possible [...] that 
there are no stars, no such physical things. Our visual data do not imply stars exist. Physical stars 
must be one thing, our visual data quite another.' (Ebersole 1967: 509). And it is also possible that, 
even if the star still exists, it no longer glows as it does, e.g., it is not so bright. Our visual data do 
not imply the brightness. That bright glow must be one thing, our visual data another.  Yet, (it is 
assumed here) we do perceive something, irrespective of whether or not the star exists or glows 
like that. Therefore, what we perceive must be different to the star itself, e.g., sense-data. 
Thus, there is a negative and a positive claim in the time-lag argument. The negative conclusion is 
that,  since  our  perception  of  external  things  is  not  simultaneous  with  the  external  things 
themselves, we do not directly perceive the external things. The positive conclusion is that, since 
we perceive  some things  directly, and thus simultaneously with our perceiving, it must be some 
things  other  than  the  external  things  we  believe  we  perceive.  These  ‘some  things’  are  the 
intermediary entities of indirect realism, e.g., sense-data.
1.1. Response: Directly Perceiving the Past
The  most  direct  counter-attack  against  the  time-lag  argument  is  this:  the  subject  having  the 
perception does not have to be simultaneous with the external thing directly perceived. As Ayer 
puts it, the time-lag argument ‘draws its strength from the fact that one tends to think of seeing as 
concerned only with the present [...] whatever it is that we see must exist here and now if it exists 
at all. But this assumption is not unassailable. Why should it not be admitted that our eyes can 
range into the past, if all that is meant by this is that the time at which we see things may be later 
than the time when they are in the states in which we see them?  And having admitted this, why 
then should we not  also admit  it  is possible to see things which no longer  exist?'  (Ayer  1982: 
94-95). 
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The time-lag argument lacks something belonging to a similar argument from hallucination. Unlike 
hallucinations, what we perceive actually existed. Le Morvan writes:
The claim “if something no longer exists, we cannot now perceive it” can be interpreted in at 
least two distinct ways: (a) if something no longer exists, we cannot now perceive it as it 
presently is, or (b) if something no longer exists, we cannot now perceive it as it used to be. 
When taken in the sense of (a), the claim is obviously true, or so we may suppose. But 
when taken in the sense of (b), the claim is far from obviously true. For why couldn’t we 
now visually aware of something as it was which no longer exists? … 
(Le Morvan 2004: 223-224)
However, this response has problems as well. 'We not only see the distant past but we often point 
to it; we point to the distant past, it being right now before us.' (Ebersole, op. cit.: 516). How can we 
point at past things before us? Surely these so-called ‘past things’ are present things? Similarly, 
Dretske states that such a response is a resort  to 'heroic methods'  and an 'outright sacrifice of 
common sense in order to save common sense.' (Dretske 1969: 72). The point being: it is counter-
intuitive to hold that we directly perceive the past.
Yet, this is not the end of the discussion. According to Ayer, directly perceiving the past is only 
counter to pre-theoretical  intuitions, ones we have before we encounter physical laws.  Given the 
time-lag, the star we seem to see shining in the sky is shining in the past. If we accept this we have 
to give up at  least  some  pre-theoretical  intuitions:  either  that  we directly  perceive  only what  is 
happening now or we directly perceive external things. '[W]e have to balance the oddity of saying 
that we can see what is past against the oddity of saying that we do not see physical objects; and 
to give our eyes access to the past may well seem the more reasonable course.' (op. cit.: 94-95). 
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The issue is not whether our direct perception of the past is pre-theoretically natural to us, i.e., it is 
not about the common-sense or naïve view, but how it compares to the thesis of indirect realism. 
Directly perceiving the past may sacrifice common-sense but common-sense must be sacrificed in 
any case.
Finally on this response, Ebersole raises a question about the intuitive force of the simultaneity of 
what we perceive and having a perception: '"we do not see the present of the stars but only their 
distant pasts”. Does this counter an error, a “common-sense” mistake, one that all of us make? I do 
not know what it could be. Chisolm seems confident that it does: “… we tend to assume, until we 
are  taught  otherwise,  that  any  event  or  state  of  affairs  we  perceive  must  exist  or  occur 
simultaneously with our perception of it.” How did he find this out? Do we all assume this? Could 
we ask and learn?' (Ibid.: 519; see Hinton 1966 for comment).
I  disagree  with  Ebersole  here,  and  agree  with  Dretske  and  Chisholm.  Insofar  as  there  is  a 
common-sense view on these matters, it is that we directly perceive only what is happening now. 
The question is: why do we have this view? Perhaps it is because of two intuitive assumptions. 
(i) The things that we directly perceive are real; It is assumed here that this is uncontroversial. 
(ii)  What is not happening right at  this moment,  but instead is only past (or future)  is  not real.  
However, unlike (i), (ii)  is  controversial. One significant strand in the contemporary metaphysical 
debate about time questions this  intuitive assumption; in particular, as we will see, it seems we 
must deny it due to issues regarding contemporary physics.
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1.2. Directly Perceiving The Spatial Arrangement of Things
There is a further  issue here,  concerning the spatial  arrangements  of  what  we perceive.  If  we 
directly perceive external  things as we seem to do, then we ought  to also perceive the spatial 
relations between them. Now, it is uncontroversial that we can be mistaken about particular spatial 
properties;  we commonly misinterpret the relative distances (and indeed sizes) between things, 
e.g., the stars we seem to see may appear to be twinkling just above the trees. However, it is much 
more compelling that a great deal of what we directly perceive is external; perhaps the stars are 
not that near but that they are outside of our own bodies seems uncontroversial. If this is so, then 
what we directly perceive is at a spatial distance from us, i.e., it is spatially related to us (although 
we may not know the exact spatial relation). 
However,  according  to  Houts  1980,  even  if  we do directly  perceive  past  external  things,  they 
cannot be spatially related to us: '[no] presently existent physical thing is at any spatial distance 
from any presently non-existent physical thing. For example, I (or my body) am not now at any 
spatial distance from the atomic blast over Hiroshima.'  (Houts 1980: 151). Thus, the past things I 
directly perceive are at no spatial distance from me. True, if they still exist now, the things that I 
perceive  may be at  some physical  distance from me now.  But  the question  is:  'at  the time of 
perception,  are we (or our bodies)  always,  or ever,  at  some spatial  distance from the physical 
events and stages that we perceive?' (Ibid: 152). Not if what we perceive are past things, so Houts' 
claims.  
This undermines the appearance of external things; even if what we directly perceive was external, 
it is not external now; what we might call something's 'being external' is a spatial relation between it 
and ourselves; it is external by not being here, by being at some distance from us. Yet, if it cannot 
be spatially related to us, then it clearly cannot be at a distance to us; thus, it cannot be external, 
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denying how it appears. 
Worse yet, not only are things that seem to be some spatial distance from us not distant from us, 
but many of them are not even spatially related to each other. Imagine you stand in the centre of a 
circle of stars, the light from each of which reaches you now. The light from each star you perceive 
is emitted at the same time; thus, each thing you perceive is spatially related to the other things 
you perceive, each thing being at the same time. Now, Houts asks us to imagine that we look out 
on a clear night and see the stars, the moon and our own hand (ibid: 155). As far as we can tell, 
these appear to stand in spatial relations to each other. 
However, each of these things is a different distance from us. The light from each of them takes a 
different amount of time to get to us. Thus, my perceptions are of each as it is at a different time: 
my perception of my hand is of my hand as it is a later time than what I perceive of the moon, and 
my perception of the moon is as the moon is at a time  later  than what I perceive of the star. If 
Houts is right, things at different times are not spatially related; thus, my hand, the moon, and the 
star  as I  perceive  them are  not  spatially  related.  They  appear  to  be spatially  related but  now 
appearances and reality do not line up. '[D]o we ever  observe  physical events and stages which 
are or were in a three-dimensional array? The answer, as I have argued, is, No. At best, our field of 
view  appears  to  have  depth,  appears  to  be  an  array  of  events  and  stages  ordered  in  three 
dimensions.' (ibid: 156).
Unsurprisingly, this is an important consequence for direct realists who support direct perception of 
the  past:  it  undermines  any  direct  perception  of  three-dimensional  space.  Even  if  we  directly 
perceive past things, we do not directly perceive their three-dimensional spatial relations. Yet we 
seem to perceive these spatial relations as directly as we perceive the things themselves. 
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Indeed, the relation between spatial relations and objects is much more intimate; given the things 
have shape, as they do if they are physical  objects,  we arguably  need to perceive their  spatial 
relations to perceive the things themselves.  In particular,  for external  things,  we see the three-
dimensional  spatial  relations  of  their  shapes.  If  we  do  not  directly  perceive  three-dimensional 
relations, then we do not see the shape of external things themselves. How then can we even say 
we see external things, given they are three-dimensional?
But  should  we  make  this  assumption  with  Houts?  Again,  this  assumption  depends  on  one's 
metaphysical conception of time. Given a different position, it is not so obvious we must say this; 
indeed, doing so raises particular problems for indirect realism, as will be seen.
2. Perceiving Simultaneity and Space
It  might  be  that  the  time-lag  argument  is  independent  of  ones'  concept  of  time.  This  section 
examines that possibility. As discussed, the time-lag provides two motivations for indirect realism:
(a)  We only directly perceive what is simultaneous with our having the perception, and thus not 
external things.  In response, some argue that we can directly perceive what is not simultaneous 
with our having the perception. 
(b) We may directly perceive past things, but past things are not spatially related to us (or, in many 
cases, to each other); thus, what we directly perceive are not external to us, contra to how they 
seem. 
Given the response to (a), there seems to be a simple rejoinder to (b): past things can be spatially 
related to us (and each other).  This has not obviously been advanced in the literature.  But for 
12
reasons related to simultaneity, there is argument against this given one's conception of time.  
The  deeper  issue  concerns  (a):  Is  it  necessary  for  (i)  what  one  directly  perceives  to  be 
simultaneous with (ii) one's perceiving or having the perception? The difference between these is 
discussed below, in order to explore two issues: first, in light of such discussions, if there are any 
problems in particular  from the time-lag for direct realism; second, if indirect realism is any better 
for  avoiding  such  problems.  This  leads  us  then  to  the  next  section,  on  the  metaphysical 
conceptions of time.
2.1. The Spatial Relations of What We Directly Perceive 
Regarding appearances of external things, which has the advantage? If we do directly perceive 
external things, then the external things that we directly perceive can be spatially arranged as they 
seem to be arranged. This is the case if they can be spatially related over time, contra Houts. But 
even where they are not, if they still exist, the star, moon and my hand may be spatially related as 
they seem to be. However, this does not work as well for intermediate entities such as sense-data. 
Can  intermediate  entities  stand  in  these  apparent  spatial  relations?  Perhaps,  but  only  if  we 
concede further counter-intuitive views than those already present in such theories. If they do not, 
then they cannot be arranged as they appear to be arranged. Thus, appearances do not given the 
advantage to indirect realism over direct realism.
Say we directly  perceive  intermediary  entities  now,  i.e.,  all  at  one time,  and they  are spatially 
related,  and  they  are  where  they  appear  to  be.  Then,  since  they  appear  to  be  external,  the 
intermediary entities will be at a distance from us in external space, i.e.,  the intermediary entities 
will occupy external space. If so, two statements must be true of these entities: 
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(i) Although intermediaries between far away, past things and ourselves, the mediating entities are 
also where those far away things are. 
(ii) The intermediate entities in a single perception of variously different things are all happening 
now. Thus, each entity occupies its distant, external location at the same time as all the others. 
Thus, external events that we seem to perceive are (somehow) succeeded by mediating entities – 
entities which then occupy the same location as the external events. Yet, each mediating entity 
does  so  after  significantly  different  durations,  e.g.,  my  hand's  mediating  entity  does  so  after 
hundreds of millionths of a second, the moon's after a few seconds, the star's after a few years. 
These  are  different  durations  which  somehow  ensure  that  we  perceive  these  entities 
simultaneously. How could there be such entities out there at those places, perceivable only when 
stimuli from other events at their location reach us? Do we put them out there? - Literally project  
what we directly perceive out into external space, instantaneously moving them to the locations of 
the relevant  external,  past  events?vii Such claim seems deeply problematic,  independent  of the 
debate here (see Moritz 1970 for a closely related discussion).
A more plausible thesis is one of the following: if intermediate entities have any physical spatial 
location at all, then they are a local  effect of distant events, e.g., in the brain (e.g., Smart 1970). 
Alternatively, perhaps, they have  no spatial location (if one is a dualist, and believes further that 
what  we directly  perceive  are mental  entities,  one  might  hold  this  latter  view).  An anonymous 
referee has raised another interesting possibility: most sense-datum theorists from Price on accept 
that sense-data have a property of private phenomenal  depth. We might take this as a special 
case of sense-data being spatially arranged in a private  phenomenal space. So, perhaps sense-
data (or other intermediary entities) are spatially arranged as they seem to be, given that they are 
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arranged in this private phenomenal space.
However,  in all  of  these options,  given we seem to perceive things that  are  external,  no such 
intermediary entities will be spatially arranged as they seem to be arranged. Again, we seem to 
directly perceive things spread out over an external space, e.g., we seem to see the moon and 
stars at a remove from our own body. An external space is a public space; it is not private in any 
sense desired here (my garden is private in some sense, but it is public in that it can be moved 
through by something like a cat). Intermediary entities may be in the brain, nowhere in space, or in 
some private space; but if they seem to be out in external space, they are not in the space they 
seem to be in. 
Thus, Houts' argument is not obviously an argument from appearances to indirect realism - unless, 
that is, the intermediate entities occupy external space. We may directly perceive the actual spatial 
relations of, e.g., sense-data, private or otherwise, but these spatial relations are not the spatial 
relations that they seem to be. Of course, if Houts is right otherwise, and external things cannot be 
spatially related at all, indirect realism does have this advantage: what we directly perceive can be 
in some spatial relations, unlike the external things of direct realism. 
2.2. The Simultaneity of Perceiving and What We Perceive 
There  is  still  the  main  time-lag  argument:  we  perceive  mediating  entities  rather  than  external 
events because we perceive something  now,  i.e.,  our perceiving is simultaneous with what  we 
perceive. 
Given the discussion of the last section, appearances do support this; indeed, this is just why the 
time-lag is so surprising. We look at what seems to be a distant star and it appears to be shining 
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now. So, how can a direct realist seriously claim that we are seeing it shine many years ago? 
One response might  be draw an analogy with our failure to perceive distances:  we  do  directly 
perceive past things, e.g., distantly shining stars; however, just as we can be mistaken about the 
distance between ourselves and these stars, we can be mistaken about when they are shining as 
well. For example, if I look down a row of houses on a street, then I look at events at a variety of 
earlier times. From where I stand, I see each house illuminated at an earlier time than any houses 
nearer than it. The whole row recedes into both the distance and the past. It is just that neither 
'how far' nor 'how long ago' of what I see is easily apparent to me; I must work them out. 
Is this plausible? It certainly does not seem to be common-sense, as has already been discussed. 
But what other reason is there to prefer the simultaneity of what we perceive with our having of the 
perception?
One  consideration  is  this:  the  external  things  which  we  seem  to  directly  perceive  seem 
simultaneous  with  other  things  which  are  happening  now.  These  include  what  I  do  and  what 
happens to me, e.g.,  my thoughts,  my own actions,  myself  indeed at this particular  place from 
which I view the star. It seems correct to say that these are happening at the same time as I am 
having the perception. For convenience in this paper, this is assumed (although relativity, which is 
relevant later, does affect this assumption). If direct realism of external things is true, and there is a 
time-lag, then why does the shining star  seem simultaneous with my thoughts about it, or indeed 
other  local  events,  such as events in my body,  including whatever  happens to me – including 
having the perception? 
One response comes from Power: we do not perceive simultaneity between x and y; rather, we fail 
to perceive duration between x and y. In this case, the distant star and my own thoughts, actions, 
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etc. seem to be simultaneous only because I fail to perceive the durations between them (Power 
2010).
This may be a response to the simultaneity between the various things that we directly perceive. 
Yet, there is a separate issue that seems at least as important and problematic. This concerns the 
simultaneity of what we directly perceive with our perceiving them. A certain way of thinking about 
the relationship between these undermines any direct realist response. However, I will suggest that 
this response is not particular to the time-lag argument. It is a general issue for direct realists of 
external things. 
The  positing  of  intermediate  entities  must  succeed  because  there  is  no  time  between  their 
existence or occurrence and the subject having the perception. If there is such a delay, no matter 
how brief,  the  intermediate  entities  are  themselves  indirectly  perceived;  the  time-lag  argument 
applies to our perception of intermediate entities, making it redundant as an argument for indirect 
realism. 
How might intermediate entities be simultaneous with our perceiving them?  One answer is this: 
intermediate entities occupy the same place as having the perception of them. There is no delay 
because there is no space which signals must cross. However, this raises another question: are 
the intermediate entities  different  to the perceptions of them; that is, are they numerically distinct 
from perception? If they are, then more than one thing occupies the same space; what we directly 
perceive and the perception itself spatially coincide. 
 
Can we assume this coincidence? Given one understanding of the relationship between perception 
and what we perceive, it seems unproblematic: if perceiving happens anywhere, it happens where 
what we perceive happens. However, there is a problem once we consider what we include here in 
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both a perception and what we seem to perceive.  
2.2.1. Perceptual Structure
Throughout this paper, reference has been made to a subject's 'perceiving' or 'having a perception' 
as distinct from what a subject (directly) perceives. I take this distinction from Moore, who drew 
something close to it between sensing, having a sensation and what we sense (sense-data; Moore 
1953). Here, three closely related questions are asked: 
(i) What is perceiving or having a perception, and how is it distinct from what we perceive?
(ii) When does the perceiving or having a perception happen? 
(iii) How  should  when  the  perception  happens  relate  to  when  what  we  directly  perceive 
happens? 
If there is no distinction between having a perception and what is perceived, the answers to the 
last questions are trivial. As they are the same, the  relation is identity, i.e., 'they' happen at one 
time, simultaneously, because 'they' are an 'it'. Yet, along with Moore, I do not think we should hold 
this identity (see below). 
Let us go into a little more detail about the structure of perception. I assume in this discussion that 
there  are  three  important  elements,  parts  or  constituents  of  the  perceptions  considered  here. 
These are: 
(a) Subjective activity: when a subject has a perception, something happens to the subject. (This is 
a very minimal understanding of 'subjective').  What happens may be mental or physical (if there is 
a difference), e.g., thoughts, neural events.  There may be nothing apparent in this activity. All that 
matters  is  that  it  is  whatever  happens  to  the  subject  of  the  perception  when  they  have  the 
perception. It obviously includes their perceiving or having the perception, but it can also include 
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other things (see below). 
(b)  Relational (or intentional):  a direct perception is a relation between ourselves and something; 
we  directly  perceive  something;  some  think  of  this  relational  feature  of  perceptions  as  its 
intentionality (following Brentano; see Jacquette 2005 for discussion); others may disagree. Here, it 
is assumed. 
(c)  Phenomenology:  we  seem  to  perceive  external  things.  This  may  not  be  necessary  for 
perception generally (e.g., Humphrey  2008). However,  it is here, as I am concerned with cases 
where we seem to perceive external things. 
Phenomenology gives rise to two further important features of perception. 
(ci)  Spatial  appearance:  When  having  a  perception  of  what  seems  to  be external  things,  the 
subject appears, to themselves, to be spatially separated from much of what they directly perceive. 
This is just why what they directly perceive seem to be external. 
As such, what we seem to perceive happening out there is accompanied by something else: a 
sense of ourselves, as subjects having the perception, located in space. One might call this an 
awareness by the subject that they have a spatial point-of-view or even, perhaps, that they are 
embodied. I consider this distinctness necessary for something to seem external or distant; what 
we perceive has to seem external  or distant  to something  else,  e.g.,  in the case of  embodied 
beings such as humans, apparently external things seem to be outside human bodies.viii 
(ii)  Internal phenomenology: having a perception does not just involve what seem to be external 
things, and our own distinctness from them; we also seem to be aware of internal things. Besides 
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what seems to be my body located here and the distant mountains there, I seem to be aware of my 
thoughts and my pains. 
This is important; this paper assumes (for simplicity) that this internal activity is simultaneous with 
the subjective activity of a perception, e.g., we seem to have our conscious thoughts about what 
we perceive when neural activity related to what we perceive is happening. It is also intuitive to 
suppose  that  when  internal  phenomenology  and  subjective  activity  happens  is  when  one  is 
perceiving or has a perception. Analogously, the place where such activity happens, and perhaps 
the accompanying thoughts, may be thought of as the place where one has a perception.ix 
These elements of perception allow examination of issues concerning the relationship between 
when we are perceiving or having a perception, and when what we perceive occurs.
2.2.2. Having a Perception.
Some philosophers understand the distinction between perceiving or having a perception, on the 
one hand, and what we perceive, on the other, as a difference between act and the object of the 
act. Perceiving or having the perception is the act; what we perceive is the object of that act. If so, 
and we understand action as something that happens to us, then direct realists have a problem. 
However,  this is a problem that  goes beyond the time-lag argument,  at  least  regarding distant 
things.
Let a broad interpretation of 'action' be assumed here: action is something that  happens  to us. 
What  is  of  most  interest  here  is  what  happens to us  when  we are perceiving,  i.e.,  subjective 
activity.  So,  'action'  here  is  the  subjective  activity.  (One  might,  of  course,  specify  a  narrower 
meaning:  action  is  something we  do,  and what  we directly  perceive  is  a result  of  that  action. 
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However,  other  than  some  very  special  cases,  e.g.,  we  directly  perceive  the  spaghetti  we're 
boiling,  this  eliminates  direct  perception  of  external  things;  moons  and  mountains  are  not  the 
results of what we do).
As stated, such subjective activity is necessary for perceiving. But how is it related to what subjects 
directly perceive? One suggestion comes from an anonymous referee: what we directly perceive is 
a constituent of what happens to us. What we directly perceive is, we might say, part of what we 
happens to us.
If so, the time-lag argument is sound, despite any further issues concerning our conceptions of 
time. 
2.2.3. Perceptual Content as Part of What Happens to Us. 
The anonymous referee's challenge to direct realism is worth quoting in full: 
'[I]t seems to me to be very plausible to say that an act or event and its content  must  
temporally coincide/overlap. For example, to say that World War II happened between 1939 
and 1945, but that (some of) the battles that made it up took place before 1900 would make 
no sense. On any account of time, the act/event of my perceiving the star now takes place 
now. If the act is (partly at least) essentially composed of its content, and the content is  
(some feature of) the star I see, that feature must exist when the event/act of my seeing 
exists. It might be argued that I can be part of a process that starts before my existence 
(and goes on after it) – e.g. ‘human history’ – but this does not show that something can 
happen to me or that I can do something at a time when I do not exist.' 
The assumption here is that what I directly perceive (the 'content') is part of what happens to me. 
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What happens to me, including what I directly perceive, cannot happen when I do not exist; hence, 
the time-lag argument succeeds. 
Yet, should a direct realist about external things share this assumption even if there were no time-
lag? To do so requires assent to one of the following distinct alternatives: 
(i) What I directly perceive is something that happens to me and is where I am. 
(ii) What I directly perceive is something that happens to me and is somewhere else than where I 
am.
A direct  realist  must  deny (i).  If  it  is  (i),  then what  I  directly  perceive  cannot, by definition,  be 
something external; external things are not where I am. There is no need for a time-lag; all that is 
required for denying direct perception of external things, i.e., things there,  is that we only directly 
perceive what happens here. 
A  direct  realist  might  admit  (ii),  as  it  allows  us  to  directly  perceive  things  elsewhere.  Thus, 
(somehow or other) what happens to a subject is something that happens at a distance from them. 
What happens to us need not happen where we are. 
Yet (ii) raises this question: why is it we can say of space what we cannot say of time? Why is it 
that what happens to us can be where we are not if what happens to us cannot be when we are 
not?
This option points to a different response for the direct realist. If a direct realist wants to hold that 
we directly perceive external things (or their properties), they should resist a more basic claim in 
this analysis of perception;  they should argue against  the claim that  what  we directly perceive, 
when we perceive external things, is always something that happens to the subject. Given direct 
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realism, some external things (and their properties) are independent  of the subject that directly 
perceives them. What happens to the subject is not independent  of the subject.  There may be 
many challenges to the direct realist doing this, (e.g., perhaps the same challenges as those for 
transparency theory), but they are not particular to the time-lag argument. 
So what is it that is particular about our relation to things at other times which is not there in our 
relation to things at other places? Again, a response could be that the claim that what I see is 
when  I exist is more compelling than the claim that what I see is  where  I exist. We should not 
presume an analogy here. One may happily admit that what we directly perceive is else-where but 
less happily that it is else-when. 
This may be so. Yet,  again,  if  this unhappiness is due to common-sense or appearances,  it  is 
common-sense and appearances which are undermined whichever side we take.  The question 
here is not whether we should abandon common sense or appearances, it is how they should be 
abandoned. Should we follow the intuitions of indirect realists or direct realists?
Let us consider what the metaphysics of time does for this question.
3. The Metaphysics of Time
The time-lag argument is based on a physical assumption: signals from events take time to travel 
across space. This includes light: light has a finite speed, and so any distance between something 
and seeing it makes it earlier than what happens to the subject when they see. 
However,  light  does  not  only  have  a  finite  speed;  according  to  modern  physics,  light  has  an 
absolute speed. This is fundamental to relativity theory. If having a perception and what we directly 
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perceive are at different points in space, relativity undermines the following claims in support of 
indirect realism: 
(a) Directly perceived x is simultaneous with having the perception. 
(b) Only what is what is simultaneous with x is spatially related to x. 
3.1. Contemporary Physics and the Time-Lag Argument
According to the conception of time in relativity theory, simultaneity is  relative  between spatially 
separated events or things. This relativity is to arbitrary and conventional inertial reference frames, 
i.e.,  frames  defined  by  velocities. Two  spatially  separated  events  which  are  simultaneous 
according to something moving at one velocity may be at different times for something moving at 
another velocity, e.g., according to a station guard, beams of light may simultaneously reflect off 
two mirrors in a station, yet reflect at different times according to a passenger on a moving train 
(see, e.g., Sider 2003; Power 2010). 
Assume for now that the intermediary entities are separated in physical space from everything else 
that happens when we perceive them, e.g., other subjective activity. If it is frame-relative that two 
events separated in space are simultaneous or at different times, it is frame-relative whether such 
entities are simultaneous with or at different times to the other subjective activity. Yet, such activity 
happens when we are perceiving,  and the motive of the time-lag argument  for indirect  realism 
depends on perceiving being simultaneous with what is directly perceived. If the simultaneity of our 
perceiving  and  intermediate  entities  depends  on  some  reference  frames,  direct  perception  of 
intermediate entities is only relative to some reference frames. From other frames, by the definition 
here, we have indirect perception of them. 
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This temporal relativity need not hold between all events standing in spatial relations. Causes that 
are at different  times to their  effect  are so in all  frames,  irrespective of how they are spatially 
located. However, clearly, advancing this kind of relation between having a perception and what's 
directly  perceived  denies  outright  that  having  a  perception  and  what's  directly  perceived  are 
simultaneous; to be relata here, they must be at different times. 
A better alternative is the other case where two things can be absolutely simultaneous: entities 
may  be  simultaneous  in  all  frames  given  they  occupy  the  exact  same  spatial  location.  Thus, 
perceiving  and  what  is  directly  perceived  spatially  coincide.  In  that  case,  they  may  be 
simultaneous. 
However, there are problems with articulating the spatial coincidence of what we directly perceive 
and having a perception. 
3.2. The Spatial Coincidence of What We Directly Perceive and Perceiving
Consider  the  elements  of  perception  listed  above:  what  we perceive;  subjective  activity  (what 
happens to us); what seems to be our own position in space; internal phenomenology. Given the 
reply here, all of these are spatially coincident.
This  response  raise  problems  regarding  these  elements'  correlations  with  the  physical  world 
(originally  raised  in  Power,  op.  cit.).  The  problems  extend  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper. 
However, a brief discussion may suffice to show the issues.  
If  these  elements  are  physically  spatially  coincident,  then  there  are  two  possibilities  for  such 
correlation: 
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(ai) All of these elements share the same physical correlate which occupies that space. 
(aii) There is a different physical correlate for each of them, but all of these physical things occupy 
the exact same region of space. 
Consider an example: I have a headache as I think of the colour of my hand, which I see (indirectly 
or directly) standing starkly against a blue sky. Given the issue above, each of these elements 
either  require a separate physical  correlate or  else they are correlated with the same physical 
thing. 
However, if (ai) several different correlates are in the same place, then there are multiple physical 
entities in one place. This is  physically unjustified: each of these is only defined at this stage by 
being a correlate of a different element of the perception; there is nothing yet physical defining their 
differences. Nor does there seem to be any evidence for such a multitude of physically overlapping 
correlates. In sum: what makes these distinct correlates physical and what reason do we otherwise 
have to believe in them? 
Yet, (aii), that there is a single physical correlate for all elements, is also problematic. There are no 
multiple  physical  entities but there still  needs to be an explanation for  how this single physical 
thing,  the physical  event  or  object,  can be correlated with significantly  distinct  elements  of  the 
perception. Say neural assembly B correlates with all the elements in the example above. How do 
we explain its correlation with my thought about my hand? How do we explain its correlation with 
what appears to be my hand? And the ache? And what seems to be the background sky? The 
problem is that whatever explanation we give for one such correlation, it cannot be the same as 
another; how B relates to a thought about hands is not the same 'how' as how B'  relates to my 
seeming to see the blue sky.x 
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For such reasons, it is problematic to assume that there is physical coincidence between (i) what 
we directly perceive and (ii) what happens to us when we are perceiving or having the perception, 
e.g.,  our  thoughts  about  what  we  perceive,  our  own body's  aches  and  pains,  etc.  The  better 
alternative  is to hold that  the intermediate  entities,  e.g.,  the sense-data,  have spatially  distinct 
physical  correlates from what  happens to us when we are perceiving.  But this makes what  we 
directly perceive and the rest of the perception either only simultaneous in some frames or not at 
all (if causal). 
Thus, the theory of relativity raises particular difficulties for the assumption that what we directly 
perceive is simultaneous with everything else that happens when we have a perception. 
Relative  simultaneity  also  has  similar  consequences  for  Houts'  claim that  there  are  no spatial 
relations between things at different times. In that case, only simultaneous things can be spatially 
related.  Yet,  again:  if  events  are  simultaneous  and  spatially  separated  only  relative  to  some 
frame(s),  and are at different times in some  other  frame(s),  then events in the latter frame are 
either 
(bi) Not spatially related at all, because they are at different times. 
(bii) Spatially related and at different times. 
If (bi) is true, what we directly perceive are spatially related only in some frames. In others, they are 
not. Thus, by taking on Houts' assumption, we make spatial relatedness frame-relative, dependent 
on a velocity.  Yet, if (bii) is true, the assumption is denied: things at different times are spatially 
related.xi 
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It seems that, in order to preserve the assumption that things at different times are not spatially 
related, and remain consistent with relativity, one must hold that one's frame, i.e., one's velocity, 
determines  whether  or  not  such  events  are  actually  spatially  related.  I  consider  this  far  more 
counter-intuitive than the alternative.  Still,  as intuitions are problematic in any case,  I leave the 
discussion here. What is hopefully shown here is that a direct realist response to the lag is not the 
so obviously worse than the indirect realist response. 
Might the problem here be relativistic physics? Perhaps this shows we must reject relative time for 
perception. There are two ways this can be done. 
First,  we  (i)  constrain  relative  time  only  to  physical  events,  (ii)  insist  that  perceptions  not  be 
conceived as physical events, and, thus, (iii) argue that relative time does not apply to perceptions. 
However, there are problems with such an approach. As with the coincidence response, these go 
beyond the scope of this paper (requiring, undoubtedly, further work) but a brief discussion of one 
problem may suffice. 
If we limit relativistic time to physical events, we must limit its temporal relations to physical events, 
having other temporal relations for mental events. Thus, there must be separate physical temporal 
relations  to mental  temporal  relations.  But  then there  is a problem with  mind-body interaction. 
Causation requires temporal  relations between cause and effect;  cause precedes effect.  If  one 
denies that there are temporal relations between physical and mental things, then how can there 
be this causation between them? How can a mental cause precede a physical effect, or vice versa, 
if they do not share temporal relations? 
Those who insist on this view at the very least owe an account of non-temporal causation, or some 
alternative to causation itself, in ways that explain how what seem to be temporally related physical 
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and mental events are not so related. (For discussions related to this, see, e.g., Lockwood 1984a 
and 1984b, Gibbins 1985, Weintraub 1998, Smythies 2003, Allen 2006).
Second,  deny  the  standard  interpretation  of  relativity  outlined  above.  Space  and time  are  not  
relative to some arbitrary and inertial  references frames. They are absolute. Notably, this is the 
approach of those who insist on a particular metaphysical position in the debate about existence in 
time. So, to close this paper, we turn to how the time-lag argument relates to the positions in that 
debate.
3.3. The Metaphysical Debate about Temporal Existence: Presentism and Eternalism
As noted at the end of section 1.2., there is an issue with claiming that we perceive things that are 
only in the past. What is only in the past no longer exists;  how, then, can we perceive it? This 
problem is not  reflected in what  might  be considered the analogous spatial  case of  perceiving 
distant things. 
I assume that the statement that 'what is only in the past no longer exists' is trivially true: if it is only  
past, it is not present; if something 'no longer exists', it does not exist now; and I take it that, if x is 
'not present', then x does not exist now.  So, if x is only in the past, then x no longer exists.
However, that what is only in the past does not exist, where 'exists' is unqualified (by 'no longer', at 
least) is a different issue. It is an issue which takes us into a current metaphysical debate about 
time. This debate concerns two different conceptions of what exists or is real in time. 
According to the position of presentism, only what is present exists. Nothing at other times than the 
present exists (e.g., Hinchliff 1996, Prior 1998). Even what happened only a second ago does not 
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exist;  neither  does  what  will  happen  in  a millisecond  after  you read  this.  In  contrast,  there  is 
eternalism: what exists at any time is equally as real as what exists at any other time, irrespective 
of which time is present (e.g., Le Poidevin 2003). 
Presentism is  typically  claimed  to be the  default  position  on time.  Indeed,  according  to  some 
presentists, to think otherwise is to misunderstand the concept of time (e.g., Geach 1998, Prior 
1998). Eternalists have not agreed, arguing that presentism leads to more problems than it solves 
(e.g., Le Poidevin, 2004). Notably, they argue that presentism is incompatible with relativity theory 
(e.g.,  Sider,  op.cit.).  In response,  presentists  have insisted that  our pre-relativistic  or  common-
sense conceptions of time are too fundamental to be revised by physical considerations (e.g., Prior 
1998, Geach 1998; see Sider 2003 for rejoinders). 
What is the affect of holding presentism on our perception of external things and events? Given 
that  there  is  time-lag,  presentists  must  be  indirect  realists.  They  are  committed  to  what  an 
eternalist is not: at the time the perception occurs, the thing perceived no longer exists, and for a 
presentist, this means that there is no such thing. For a presentist, then, arguments which favour 
direct  realism lose a lot  of  their  force:  even if  the star  I see shining in the sky exists in some 
unqualified sense, because it still exists, the actual shining I perceive does not. 
Similarly, Houts' assumption that things at different times are not related spatially is correct; given 
one thing is present,  the things at other times are not present;  thus they do not exist.  Lacking 
existence, they do not have spatial relations with anything (even if they once did). Thus, if I seem 
to perceive them in any spatial relations, this perception would be illusory. But Houts' point is rather 
insignificant in comparison to what makes this so: that, for a presentist, if I seem to perceive such 
things in any way at all, this perception is illusory: being past, they do not exist. 
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Thus, it seems that, for the presentist, the time-lag argument for indirect realism works. Why is 
this?  Perhaps  presentism  turns  the  time-lag  argument  into  something  like  an  argument  from 
hallucination. For a presentist, past events are as open to our direct perception as the apparent 
objects and events in hallucinations; a star shining in the past can no more be directly perceived 
than the pink rats in a fever-driven dream. 
Given eternalism, however, we are not committed to the idea that the external events and things 
we seem to perceive do not exist. Although they may  no longer exist,  this does not deny their 
unqualified existence. As such, eternalists might hold that we can directly perceive external things. 
What must be said about them, however, is that they are not happening at the same time as we 
are having the perception. 
Some eternalists  might  still  hold that  indirect  realism is true,  e.g.,  because of  arguments  from 
hallucinations and illusions. However, should they do so because there is a  time-lag? We have 
examined some intuition-driven motivations to do so. However, we have also discussed a problem 
from relativistic physics. And this brings us to one significant motivation for holding eternalism over 
presentism: relativity itself. If one is an eternalist, one is very likely to accept relativity. If so, then 
this paper argues that they should reject the time-lag argument's basic assumption: that what we 
directly perceive must be simultaneous with the subjective activity of perceiving. 
4. Conclusion 
We have discussed the following:
(1) The time-lag argument against direct perception of external things.
(2) The direct realist response to the time-lag: that we directly perceive things at other times. 
Problems with this response. Whether or not such problems are particular to the time-lag or 
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problems for direct realism generally. 
(3) An issue for the indirect realist assumption of simultaneity between perceiving and what we 
perceive from relativistic physics. Possible indirect realist responses, and their problems.
(4) Two metaphysical  conceptions of time, and which sides advocates of these conceptions 
can take in this debate.  Presentists must  be indirect  realists;  eternalists could be direct 
realists.
As discussed at the start, it may be that direct realism and presentism are  both  false positions. 
There are other arguments than the time-lag argument for indirect realism. In addition, this paper 
has concentrated on what we seem to see, e.g., on seeing our hand, the moon, and distant stars, 
and directly perceiving these external things seems intuitive. However, it may be more problematic 
to claim that we directly perceive external things given other kinds of sensory perception. When I 
step out into my garden and look at the night sky, I can smell the jasmine by the gate. There is a 
time-lag between pollen  leaving the surface of  the flower  and my smelling  it.  But  do I  directly 
perceive  here the analogue of  seeing the star?  That  is,  do I  smell  the pollen  as it  leaves  the 
flower? 
Perhaps some perceptions of external things are more direct than others; perhaps our intuitions 
about this are not dependable. There is further work in this. Here, the hope is only to show that the 
time-lag does not deny the possibility of directly perceiving what we appear to perceive, that is, 
external things. 
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i Cases of seeing, hearing, tasting, and so on, are referred to here as cases of  perceiving;  one might also call them 
cases of sensing or sensory perception. In addition, by 'direct' perception I follow Austin's view: it is 'direct' in contrast to 
indirect perception; like Austin, I think of 'direct' as a 'trouser' word like 'real': it is applied to contrast it to cases which are 
not simply perception (Austin 1964). Here, it is in contrast to our sensing of something via something else, i.e., indirect 
perception.
Also, it may be that perceiving is more than just sensory experience, e.g., for perception, perhaps one needs to 
know what it  is that they are experiencing;  or, at least, have a concept of what they experience; or, perhaps, what 
appears to them must be what it seems to be in order that they perceive it. However, I will not debate these conditions 
for perception. This paper concerns what we can perceive (directly or indirectly); I put aside what is further needed for 
perception. 
ii Loose reference is made here to to objects, events, entities, etc. as 'things', as in – 'what is that thing?'; 'How are things 
going with you?'; also, to the existence of things; in doing so, the existence of objects from the occurrence of events are 
not strictly distinguished. This is just for ease of expression; however important it may otherwise be, it does not seem to 
significantly alter this discussion. 
iii This  in/direct distinction may not only be true of our perception of external things; perhaps we indirectly perceive 
internal  things as well,  e.g.,  hunger.  However,  as will  be  discussed,  perceptions of  external  things  are particularly 
sensitive to the time-lag argument, so these are particularly focussed on in this paper. 
iv Other philosophers have rejected reference to perceiving an intermediate entity, and insisted instead that we have 
modified  perceptions  or  sense-acts.  Adverbialists  translate  sentences  which  suggest  we  perceive  something  into 
sentences which eliminate the reference to a perceived thing, e.g., 'I see a red sense-datum' becomes 'I see redly'. 
Adverbialism seems to be an attempt to avoid commitment to sense-data, which have the relevant properties 
that we  seem to perceive. For example, if we must deny that physical objects are coloured, but they still  seem to be 
coloured, adverbialists avoid sense-data that are coloured by insisting that, e.g.,  'I perceive a red ball', is really 'I red-ly 
perceive a ball'. 
The issue here is whether or not what we directly perceive can be external as it seems to be. It is assumed here 
that we directly perceive something. Perhaps we do not, even if we can directly perceive external things; however, space 
prevents considering this separate issue (e.g., Clarke 1987, Casullo 1987; for something similar, see Humphrey 2008).
v  This use of 'sense-data' is the common but not necessarily only use for this term. Moore introduces it in preference to 
an ambiguous use of 'sensation'; it seems that he originally meant the terminology to refer to whatever we directly see, 
hear, etc., and not necessarily to some internal entities which mediate our perceptions of external things. Given that 
understanding, there would be sense-data even given direct realism: external things would be sense-data. (For more on 
this usage, see, e.g., Moore 1953 and Tully 1978). However, the more common meaning is used here.
vi See later for a discussion on the time when the subject has the perception.
vii One option might be that we project these entities across external space in the moment we perceive them, e,g., after 
being stimulated by external events, we somehow beam what we directly perceive across external space to the places 
where the original  events occurred.  The intermediary entities will  have to travel through this space instantaneously. 
Otherwise, the entities will not happen at distant places all at the same time. 
viii Perhaps this  would not  hold  for  disembodied  thinking beings.  Can one seem spatially  located if  one  only  has 
thoughts? Could the world seem to have distant and external things to a disembodied spirit? What sense of 'here' could 
their thinking have? 
ix However, that there is such a single place and time is just a convenience. As discussed further on, relativity raises 
complications with assuming any single moment for such activity. There is also a more general issue with assuming a 
single spatial location for such varied activity, even if it is internal. Such issues are discussed in more depth elsewhere, 
e.g., Power,  ibid, and so neglected here. However, the special case of directly perceiving external things is key to this 
discussion.
x This issue is still an issue even if, as briefly stated, we insist mental entities have no spatial location. There is 
still the question of how one physical entity can correlate with a multiple of different mental entities.
xi An anonymous referee has suggested several objections to the application of relativity in this issue. Space precludes 
giving detailed responses to these here; some responses are already available in the literature (given at the end of this 
note). 
(a) 'There may be little sense in applying ‘frame of reference’ relativities here. 'Suppose my experience is of 
seeming to hear a certain note at the same time as seeming to see a certain colour patch. What does it mean to say that, 
within another frame of reference I am hearing one noticeably after the other?' 
This is discussed in Power (ibid). Briefly, it is this: it is agreed that whether or not one seems to hear a note at 
the same time as seeing a colour patch does not vary according to a frame; if you occupy a different frame to me, what 
you perceive will not be different for me because of that (it is not even clear what that could mean).  
However,  as argued in  Power,  because of  this,  given  relative  time,  (a)  the different  elements  of  what  we 
perceive are not simultaneous and (b) apparent simultaneity to merely apparent simultaneity (perhaps only a failure to 
perceive duration). As such, we merely seem to hear the note at the same time as seeing the colour patch, but we do not 
really do so.  An analogy may help: The simultaneity of what we directly perceive is analogous to the smoothness of 
what we feel when touching a polished table. 
(b) 'A more irenic response would be to suggest that the reference frame relativity available to two events as 
close as those taking place in the same brain would be such that it would always fall below the threshold of  what time 
differences we can discriminate – so they would be phenomenologically simultaneous in all frames.'
Two events in the brain may be so close in occurrence that someone observing them as brain events will 
observe them as seeming to be simultaneous. In addition, as argued in Power (ibid), these events may appear to the 
subject of the brain events to be simultaneous. Yet, that does not make them actually simultaneous; it just makes them 
seem so because, e.g., in the case of other observers, they are separated by so brief a duration (the subject's own case 
is more complicated; see Power, ibid). That is, they merely seem to be simultaneous.  
Consider this 'merely seem'; if 'phenomenological simultaneity' refers merely seems to be simultaneity, then it is 
not actual simultaneity; but if phenomenological simultaneity means something stronger, that is,  apparent simultaneity 
which  is actual  simultaneity, then it is simultaneity. Thus, we either have relative simultaneity or, again, non-physical 
simultaneity (see above).
